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Abstract— Cybersecurity has become one of the largest
growing fields in computer science and the technology industry.
Faulty security has cost the global economy immense losses.
Oftentimes, the pitfall in such financial loss is due to the
security of passwords. Companies and regular people alike do
not do enough to enforce strict password guidelines like the
NIST (National Institute of Standard Technology) recommends.
When big security breaches happen, thousands to millions
of passwords can be exposed and stored into files, meaning
people are susceptible to dictionary and rainbow table attacks.
Those are only two examples of attacks that are used to
crack passwords. In this paper, we will be going over three
open-source password managers, each chosen for their own
uniqueness. Our results will conclude on the overall security
of each password manager using a list of established attacks
and development of new potential attacks on such software.
Additionally, we will compare our research with the limited
research already conducted on password managers. Finally, we
will provide some general guidelines of how to develop a better
and more secure password manager.
Index Terms—Password Managers, Password Authentication
I . INTRODUCT ION
In this paper, we will be discussing three open-source
password managers: Passbolt [24], Padlock [8], and Encryptr
[6]. We have chosen these three due to each unique quality
they carry; we will mention them here once and then bring
them up again in their separate sections. Passbolt was chosen
for its unique property in that its full potential and benefits are
reached when utilized by teams, companies, and closed groups
of people who trust each other with sensitive information;
additionally, Passbolt runs on OpenPGP [7], a secure email
encryption standard founded by Phil Zimmerman. Padlock
was chosen for its use of the Electron and Polymer developer
environment as well as being a minimalist password manager.
Lastly, Encryptr was chosen for its brow-raising qualities; all
data is stored in the cloud, and it uses Crypton, a cryptography
framework that implements a no-knowledge proof system, a
somewhat fancier way of saying end-to-end encryption. To
conclude our paper, we will compare and contrast all the
features between these password managers and more popular
ones in order to have a standard of security for this type of
software in general.
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The organization of this paper starts with the related works
in Section II. Following that we give a brief rundown and
history of password managers. We then discuss each password
manager in their own sections; we will go over Passbolt,
Encryptr, and Padlock in that order. Each section contains
subsections discussing the details of the password managers,
reported security flaws already found for them, our reported
flaws, a review and critique about the password manager,
and then some potential solutions to the vulnerabilities. The
paper concludes with suggestions of what an ideal password
manager should have; we review some features of more
popular password managers and look at the pros and cons of
both open-source and closed-source password managers.
I I . RELATED WORK
The niche of research on password managers has direct
ties to that of applied cryptography and penetration testing,
so the body of our work will go back to referencing a mix of
academic papers on the security of more popular password
managers and penetration testing write ups performed by
security auditing teams, although we will reference some
papers that display proof of concept or have contributed to
the field in some other way. Additionally, we have tried
our best to extend any and all audits performed on our
three researched password managers. The earliest work for
password managers comes from Luo and Henry in 2003 [20],
who demonstrated a proof of concept and implementation of
a more effective password manager, compared to Microsoft
Passport. In 2005, Halderman et al’s work [19] comprised the
proof of concept and implementation of a password manager
in the web-browser, where an example implementation in
Firefox was given in their work.
Moving on to the trend of security analysis, we are given
insight on popular password managers such as LastPass and
Roboform by Li, He, Song, and Akhawe [18]. Silver, Jana,
Chen, Boneh, and Jackson [3] made outstanding contributions
to the auto-fill feature found in popular password managers
such as LastPass, KeePass, and those implemented in web-
browsers such as Google Chrome and Safari. They found
critical vulnerabilities that abused the auto-fill feature; such
attacks include iFrame sweep attacks, password sync exploita-
tion, and injections. Their work would help greatly influence
the policies auto-fill executes. To show some of the root
problems as to why password managers are seeming to
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become more and more necessary, the work of Gaw and
Felten [16] would contribute statistical analysis of surveys
performed at Princeton University. Gaw and Felten found
that participants often reused passwords for less important
websites and predict this trend would grow as more on-line
accounts accumulate. Participants were found to be ignorant
to the security risks that this trend brings. They also found a
feeling of indifference towards the use of password managers.
Looking at the rising trend of cloud computing, the work of
Zhao, Yue, and Sun [14] contributed to vulnerability analysis
of LastPass and Roboform; they were able to detect threats
such as credentials being stored in plain-text on cloud servers
and offered suggestions to both product makers on how to
better secure their data and product.
To conclude the related work we mention Gasti and
Rasmussen [13]; their contributions include a forefront on
the analysis of password manager database formats, as their
paper’s title suggests: “On The Security of Password Manager
Database Format.” What Gasti and Rasmussen found was that
despite a number of password managers being different from
each other, each pretty much used the same database format.
They also found several vulnerabilities in each password
manager they investigated.
I I I . OVERVIEW OF PASSWORD MANAGERS
A. Quick Rundown
First and foremost, we must define what a password man-
ager is. Password managers are programs used to generate,
encrypt, and store passwords for a client-side user. All that
is required of a user is to remember one master password
and user name. It is believed that using such software will
increase security. Typically passwords will be stored on the
local machine itself or on some hosted server. In some cases,
they may be hosted on cloud servers to ensure more security
for the parties involved; i.e., the user and the host of the
servers/proprietors of a password manager. There is some
variety in the types of password managers available to the
public; some are built into web browsers such as Google
Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Safari, and Microsoft Edge, while
others serve as standalone programs with the capability of
web-browser integration. Some strictly enforce strong master
passwords while others do not. More notably there are a few
that have integrated multi-factor authentication, which is very
beneficial to security. Given a brief rundown of such software,
let us now delve into some history.
B. History of Password Managers
Not much is known about password managers; the first
successful implementation of an effective password manager
open to the public (to our knowledge), after the work of
Luo and Henry [20], was KeePass, developed by Dominik
Reichl [21], with an initial launch back in 2003. KeePass is
a minimalist password manager that runs on Windows, Mac
OS, and Linux, along with unofficial imports to Android,
IoS, and Blackberry. The latest versions of KeePass use
AES-256 bit encryption [40] along with ChaCha20-256 bit
encryption [41]; however, KeePass does allow you to use
other algorithms if you wish to do so, but we shall not go
over technical specifications. Following a mixed response
from the launch of KeePass, it would be a few years until
commercial success for password managers took off; LastPass,
Dashlane, and Roboform serve as prime examples, with the
LastPass being the most popular, having a reported 7 million
users as of 2015 [22]. By the 2010’s it seems as if some kind
of password manager mania has taken off. Many developers
have begun focusing their time on password managers, and to
increase popularity they made their work open-source, giving
the public a chance to use their product and view their code,
giving the technical community a chance to shape a password
manager to their liking by giving feedback on what can be
added onto or improved, or by exposing vulnerabilities [23].
This method seems to be useful in the fact that it is essentially
a free security audit. Of course, the time it would take to
report to developers would be much longer.
IV. OPEN -SOURCE PASSWORD MANAGERS
Now focusing our attention to the bulk of our work, let us
recall our three password managers: Passbolt, Padlock, and
Encryptr. Each of these password managers is open-source.
We chose to look at open-source password managers for
multiple reasons. First of all, because they are open-source,
we can look at the source code ourselves. Additionally, this
also allows us to set up our own servers to test on. Each
password manager was chosen for their own unique properties.
We shall go into technical detail about each one, along with
pointing out vulnerabilities we have found in each one and
referencing previous vulnerabilities exposed by others.
A. PASSBOLT
Passbolt is an open-source password manager initially de-
veloped by Kevin Muller, Diego Lendoiro, Remy Bertot, and
Cedric Alfonsi, with later work of Passbolt being supported
by the GitHub community. Passbolt’s core user-base includes
development teams and companies, adopting the philosophy
that company password policies can be shoddy or annoying,
which in turn creates a less efficient workspace and perhaps
some security vulnerabilities. The Passbolt development team
believes their product can be adopted to ease the process of
sharing passwords among peers and coworkers in an easier
and much more secure way [24].
1) Overview of Passbolt: Currently, Passbolt only runs in
a browser. More specifically, it only runs on Firefox and
Google Chrome. This is reportedly due to them still being in
the alpha development of Passbolt [25]. Passbolt was written
in JavaScript, PHP, and Shell, and it currently uses OpenPGP
for their encryption standard. Passwords stored in Passbolt
are encrypted, and the database used by the client can also be
encrypted to improve security. However, user names are not
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encrypted and are stored in plain text. One existing problem
for Passbolt includes the use of a bad pseudo-random number
generator [25]. There is also no current way to change your
master password or use multi-factor authentication. There
is the option of emailing a copied list of your encrypted
passwords to yourself should the option for email notification
be enabled. Passbolt also boasts the use of a color security
token which should prevent phishing, however, we believe
we have found a way to bypass this feature which we will go
into detail in our discovered flaws section. Another current
flaw reported by the Passbolt team is the predicament of the
client and server trusting all keys; although they admit to this
being a flaw, they wish to fix this error in the future [25].
2) Reported Security Flaws: Found early in the surveil-
lance of Passbolt, it was discovered by Wigginton et al that
the use of the PHPseclib has the potential to default to the
use of ECB encryption [4]. While this isn’t a direct flaw
in Passbolt itself, it is still a flaw to consider. Reported
problems by Passbolt include server integrity problems, DDoS
attacks, server information leaks, key revocation, the potential
of authentication cookies being stolen if SSL is broken, and
the potential to mimic server keys [26]. It should be noted
that Passbolt currently only uses MySQL servers, which have
had reported problems that were recently fixed by Golunski
[2]. Given that Passbolt is only in alpha and developed by
a single team rather than a company, they do not have the
resources to perform a full-stretched security audit; most
vulnerabilities have been found by the developers themselves
or by the GitHub community. The team’s use of cryptographic
functions (by use of OpenPGP) has been reviewed by security
audit team Cure53 [27]. The team was able to find several
vulnerabilities in the OpenPGP library but we shall omit the
details.
3) Our Discovered Flaws: To begin testing on Passbolt
we opted to not perform any attacks already conducted, so
we tried some of our own attacks. Before testing, we set up a
private server using the Hamachi Virtual Private Network
so that we could as closely as possible simulate a work
environment typical to what Passbolt should be used for. The
tools involved were all on Kali Linux, with the exception of
some attacks written in C# and tested on Windows machines.
It was very easy to see that a key-logger on an unsuspecting
user would give us the master password. Passbolt was also
found to be susceptible to a clipboard attack; given the
generated passwords can be somewhat hard to read, a user
will opt to just copy and paste rather than manually type their
passwords, making strong individual passwords to websites
and services seem useless if an attacker is successful.
Passbolt has a special feature to prevent phishing attacks;
a user will remember a color assigned to them and it will be
present when they attempt to log-in. We conducted an attack
on their use of this color key token; by grabbing a live copy
of a user’s session we were able to find the lines of code
that gave us the color. Simply editing these lines we now
had an exact copy of what a user would think is the login
page, all working as if it were the real thing. With this, an
attacker could potentially perform a phishing attack in which
they can steal a user’s master password. See Figure 1 and
Figure 2 for more detail.
Fig. 1: Here we can see the hex value of the color a user’s
security token
Fig. 2: By editing this hex value, we can replace the color
with any color of our choice
One other attack we created was a custom user-script. A
user-script is a custom script that users can install to gain
extra functions to websites. Users will typically not look over
all of the code in the user-script, so it would be easy to hide
two lines of malicious code in a script that looks innocent. We
created a script (see Appendix) that would secretly replace
all links that download the Firefox Passbolt extension with
another random extension. All the links appear to go to the
original website, as seen in Figure 3. Because of the way
Firefox installs extensions, the user will get a pop-up that
says the website itself wants the user to download the fake
extension, making the extension seem trusted (See Figures
4 and 5). The Passbolt extension itself can’t be modified,
however, as Passbolt detects any changes and disables itself
if it finds any. Downloading a fake extension would bypass
this, and since the extension is open-source, mimicking the
extension would be very simple. A proposed method to get
the user to download this user-script is to hide the code
inside a good user-script. As mentioned previously, the code
would most likely go unchecked. Another method would be
to hide it in an extension. The extension would then inject
the JavaScript into the website.
4) Review and Critique: Overall, Passbolt was not a very
user-friendly password manager and we question the integrity
of the product. They have no reported security audits on their
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Fig. 3: Notice how the link to download the extension appears
to go to passbolt.com
Fig. 4: Firefox shows the server itself asking you to download
the extension
Fig. 5: The link actually downloads an arbitrary extension
called NoScript
product except a reference to the audit of OpenPGP, and they
lack many key features other password managers have, which
brings into question why they would even release an alpha
version of their product. Additionally, their demo page is
quite shoddy and the intended use of the password manager
seems to often lead attackers to use cunning phishing attacks
and DDoS attacks. The design also increases the risk of an
attack on the main administrator, since they are at the core of
how Passbolt should be used by a company. It should also be
noted there is no enforcement of a strong master password,
which is in itself a big security risk.
5) Solutions to Some Vulnerabilities: We suggest that the
Passbolt team develop some features such as typing obfusca-
tion and auto-fill to protect against key-logger and clipboard
attacks. We also encourage the use of other types of servers
besides MySQL. While not all servers are perfect, giving
user options can potentially increase the overall security of
the company using Passbolt. The user-script vulnerability is
something that would be hard for Passbolt to stop, but they
should at least use an HTML content security policy that
would block scripts loaded from an off-line source, most of
the time [12]. We would also recommend some way to either
obfuscate the security token or develop some other method
in order to prevent our proposed phishing attack.
B. ENCRYPTR
Encryptr is an open-source password manager initially
developed by Tommy Williams and then bought out by
SpiderOak [28], a company focused on building services that
feature no-knowledge frameworks.
1) Overview of Encryptr: Encryptr is a cross-platform pass-
word manager, e-wallet, and note-holder written in JavaScript,
HTML, CSS, JSON, and XML. Its encryption standard was
built using the Crypton framework, created by SpiderOak.
Crypton is an open-source framework developed in JavaScript
with a primary goal to store information on a server without
the server ever knowing what is stored [1]. Crypton’s back-
end uses PostgreSQL [36], Redis [37], Node.js [38], and
Docker [39]. Encryption and decryption are assumed in
AES-256 using Galois/Counter Mode. For more specifics,
ElGamal encryption [35] and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm) [34] are used for signature verification,
elliptic curve cryptography is used for key generation, and
such ciphers can be switched for others if a user decides
to do so [1]. The strength of Crypton is the protection of
user data and data sharing, it is the direct belief of end-
to-end encryption that users may feel more secure from
attackers and the company hosting such a service. Crypton
also uses SRP (Secure Remote Password) authentication,
which reportedly limits data compromise, with the only
supposed attack that being brute forcing AES keys [1]. Some
weaknesses of Crypton include the ability of peer graph
analysis and container access frequency analysis. What we
mean by the former statement is that user-names are stored in
plain text, so it is possible for database records to be analyzed
in order to find connections between users and perform some
intelligence gathering, leading to more potential attack vectors
[1]. As for the latter, containers in Crypton can sometimes be
created, updated, and accessed deterministically, which can
lead to a potential brute force attack. However, this can be
remedied using a strong password [1]. One last note about
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Crypton and other SpiderOak applications is the use of the
clipboard, which is reported by them to be safer than just
typing all your information.
2) Reported Security Flaws: It should be noted in this
section that no official security audit of Encryptr has been
performed. Furthermore, to our knowledge no security audit
has been performed on other SpiderOak services. Only two
official security audits were performed and published on
Crypton. The main issues reported by Leviathan Security
Group include [10]:
1) An account’s public key is not verified against the
decrypted private key. This could result in a user
encrypting something that cannot be decrypted.
2) The public signing key is not verified against the private
signing key.
3) A container by the name of containerNameHMacKey
is not verified before decryption, so the server could
replace it with a different known container and encrypt
a new symmetric key to the user’s public key.
A look into the report by Least Authority gave us some
more insight into the security of Crypton which includes [11]:
1) Server information forgery: attackers with access to the
server can overwrite and forge data on a user’s account.
2) Guessable private keys: an attacker with server access
can grab copies of cipher-text and read the plain-text.
3) An attacker with server access can disclose the en-
cryption key, essentially making all container contents
available to them.
Having read both reports we noticed plenty of the attacks
included DDoSing. While not the largest security threat to
worry about, it can still cost companies quite a bit of money
and reputation. The reports failed to include auditing web-
based attacks such as XSS attacks (Cross-Site Scripting),
CSRF attacks (Cross-Site Request Forgery), Man-In-the-
Browser attacks, and SQL injections.
3) Our Discovered Flaws: Our reported findings of vul-
nerabilities for Encryptr include:
1) High security threat with clipboard attacks (copying is
the easiest way to transfer passwords from Encryptr to
a form).
2) Susceptible to key-loggers when typing your master
password or when transferring passwords from Encryptr
to a form without copy-paste.
4) Review and Critique: Encryptr was the most minimal
of the three open-source password managers reviewed by
far; it was incredibly simple, it could be used on almost all
platforms and did not require the use of an email, yet you
could still retrieve the same data from other devices. One
critique of Encryptr is that after some further investigation it
was discovered some code is still obfuscated. It is also noted
that there is no strict enforcement of strong passwords and
generated passwords have a default length of 12 characters.
5) Solutions to Some Vulnerabilities: Like for Passbolt,
we recommend SpiderOak implement an auto-fill feature for
passwords and credit-card information, along with typing
obfuscation should user’s create their own passwords instead
of generating one.
C. PADLOCK
Padlock is a minimalist, open-source password manager
developed by Martin Kleinschrodt using the Electron and
Polymer frameworks, so like Passbolt and Encryptr, it was
all written in JavaScript, HTML, and CSS, and for the most
part, all code is available to the public. Padlock is multi-
platform and can be used on Windows, MacOS, Android,
iOS, and some time in the future, Linux.
1) Overview of Padlock: Similar to Passbolt and Encryptr,
Padlock uses a copy/paste function to quicken the process of
using one’s passwords. As noted earlier, this leads to very big
security problems. One of the notable features of Padlock
is that the application automatically logs you out of your
vault in one minute if there is no user activity detected. This
feature can be changed to a maximum of ten minutes or can
even be disabled if the user wishes to do so. Padlock does
include its own password generator, however, its weakness
is that 7 character passwords with at least one uppercase
letter, lowercase letter, and special character are considered
very strong by Padlock. By the 2017 NIST standards, these
generated passwords are not considered secure [29].
2) Reported Security Flaws: Surprisingly, the creator of
Padlock has a repository for penetration testing of his own
application. Furthermore, the penetration team Cure53 was
hired to do even more extensive testing. The reports detail
some of the following vulnerabilities:
• Tap-jacking [9].
• Exposed authentication tokens during API requests,
leading to Man in the Middle attacks [9].
• Permanent DoS attack on mobile devices: an attacker
with server access can increase the number of iterations,
essentially making the CPU do a job it cannot do, and
ultimately having to make the user reset Padlock if
they want to use the application on their phone again.
However, resetting Padlock will delete all information
stored [9].
• DoS email attacks [9].
3) Our Discovered Flaws: Since Padlock uses the clip-
board like Passbolt and Encryptr, along with no auto-fill
feature, it was easy to discover that Padlock is susceptible
to clipboard attacks and key-loggers. Additionally, we wrote
a script (see Appendix) that would be able to reset a user’s
account, all that is required is the user click a button, thus
deleting all their saved passwords and information. The attack
involves a user installing a script or extension which would
then inject JavaScript into the Padlock web page. For testing
purposes, we did this using our own personal server, but we
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believe it can be easily adapted to any other server using
Padlock. We also used a user-script (defined in subsection
IV-A.3) to manipulate a vulnerability in Padlock. Padlock has
an on-line dashboard where users can change what devices
have access to their account, as well as reset their data–with
no password. To abuse this fault, we made a script that would
reset the user’s data the instant they logged into the dashboard.
It should be noted that Padlock does try to prevent this. It uses
content security policies that block off-line scripts [12]. This
method will break certain user-script managers (extensions
that install and inject the user-scripts) but some managers
are able to bypass the security policy. This is something
Padlock can’t fix but they should ask for more verification,
such as a password, to reset all of the user’s data. It is just
two clicks to clear all of the passwords and devices on an
account. It should be noted that if you don’t reset the client,
your passwords are safe, but if the cloud was the only place
where the passwords were stored, this method will make the
passwords unrecoverable. Another script (see Appendix) we
made would revoke all of the devices, meaning that the user
would lose access to the cloud on their devices. This isn’t a
huge issue, as the user can just reconnect, but it demonstrates
Padlock’s vulnerability to script attacks.
4) Review and Critique: Padlock lived up to its name of
being a minimalist password manager that got the job done
and we were quite pleased with the initial security audits that
were reported on the application. Overall it was easy to use
and the ability to use a custom server was a nice addition.
However, we did not like the minimum security standards of
generated passwords, nor was there any strict enforcement of
strong master passwords.
5) Solutions to Some Vulnerabilities: Similar to Passbolt
and Encryptr, we suggest the creation of an auto-fill feature as
well as typing obfuscation to prevent key-logger and clipboard
attacks. Additionally, we suggest that the reset feature be
removed, as loss of all passwords in one swoop can be easy;
whether they be by someone with direct access to the local
machine or by some social-engineering attack.
V. CONCLUS ION : WHAT MAKES A
PASSWORD MANAGER MORE SECURE
In this section, we will review the strengths and weaknesses
of all the password managers we looked at in comparison
with the strengths and weaknesses of more popular password
managers in order to envision what a more secure password
manager would look like.
A. Strengths of Open-Source Password Managers
Looking back at Passbolt, Encryptr, and Padlock, one of the
greatest strengths they commonly share is the fact that they
are open-source. This allows for consumers to examine the
code and report any vulnerabilities and bugs themselves to
quicken the refinement process. This method of putting trust
into the consumer eases some of the burdens for developers
and, of course, saves money; however, this does come at
the cost that bugs and vulnerabilities may be found at a
much slower pace. The option of users setting up their own
servers is also a nice feature that can potentially increase
security for users who know what they are doing, but this
can be detrimental when attackers gather knowledge of targets
using their own servers. It should be noted that the use of
end-to-end encryption by Encryptr, i.e. Crypton, is a very
desirable feature, especially for those who want the utmost
privacy they can get. Such no-knowledge features were even
commented on by Edward Snowden, who is pushing for end-
to-end encryption to become a more standard feature in cloud
storage [30].
B. Weaknesses of Open-Source Password Managers
Being open-source allows people to find vulnerabilities,
but not everyone will report the security problems they
find. An attacker can keep a vulnerability they found secret
and use it in a future attack. Additionally, quite a few
open-source password managers do not have many features
that strengthen security like more well-known, closed-source
password managers do. In order for an open-source product to
be successful, it must have a strong group of supporters that
review the code and make suggestions, and a development
team that listens to feedback and works quickly and diligently.
C. Strengths of Closed Source Password Managers
Closed source password managers have the benefit of
keeping their code hidden from potential attackers. This
means that an attacker usually won’t be able to see the
code and exploit vulnerabilities found in it. It also means
duplicating the password manager is harder, so certain attacks,
like a fake extension, wouldn’t be as effective. We would
also like to point out some of the desirable features that
closed-source password managers such as LastPass have.
LastPass includes features such as auto-fill, and two-factor
authentication using your phone, or fingerprint. LastPass
also includes the feature of passwords only being local,
meaning they are stored only on the machine [31]. Closed
source password managers also include features such as
secure file and password sharing, tracking history of what
sites were logged-in, and reports of the current strength of
your passwords. Such features were included in password
managers such as LastPass, Dashlane, and Roboform [32].
D. Weaknesses of Closed Source Password Managers
The main weakness of a closed source password manager is
the proprietor behind it. The user has to trust that the company
is securely storing their passwords, since the user doesn’t
know the details of how their passwords are being stored
and processed. The proprietor is also responsible for security
updates, and they will usually have fewer people looking over
each line of code than an open-source project would. The
users have to trust that the owner of the password manager
is responsible and active in providing security updates. Fur-
thermore, while it is not feasible to claim that closed-source
password managers are at risk of facing more attacks, the
implications behind a security breach are detrimental; larger
closed-source managers risk losing massive amounts of assets
and user data since they are larger targets with more resources
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to take from. Such an example can be seen from LastPass
in the first quarter of 2017, an exploit found by a Google
researcher revealed a flaw that could have let attackers exploit
the LastPass browser extension [33].
E. Theoretical Design for a Good Password Manager
A good password manager would prioritize security over
ease of use. Firstly, the password manager would be open-
source to ensure that anyone who uses it can know what
it is doing to protect their privacy. While a long password
may be annoying to the user, the master password must be
strong. If the master password is weak to brute force attacks, it
brings down the security of the whole password manager. For
this reason, the password manager would require a complex
master password that meets the 2017 NIST standards. We
would also suggest to add an auto-fill function to the password
manager. This would prevent clipboard and keylogger attacks
if implemented correctly. Our approach to auto-fill would be
to press a browser extension button to activate the auto-fill
function on the current site, much like certain other password
managers already do. We would also lock the user’s vault
after a specified period of inactivity set by the user (no longer
than two hours). The user would then need to type in their
master password again before using the password manager.
For cloud storage, we would suggest using a no-knowledge
approach, similar to Encryptr, to ensure that the server and
any server-side attackers don’t have access to any password.
We would allow the use of a custom server, but force the use
of HTTPS. We would try to make every step as automated
as possible to increase usability. This would include setting
up a custom server, since all of the password managers we
tested had a very difficult setup process.
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APPENDIX
1 // Changes all of the links that download the Firefox extension
2 var links =
document.querySelectorAll("a[href='https://www.passbolt.com/download/firefox']"); //
gets all links meant to download the Passbolt firefox extension
3 for (var i = 0, len = links.length; i < len; i++) { // go through all the links
4 var link = links[i];
5 link.setAttribute('onclick', "location.href='https://goo.gl/2WjK9u';return false;");
//makes the href change to our page when the link is clicked. This allows us to hide
the real location of the link since it only changes where it goes after you click the
link.
6 }
Listing 1: Script that will make all links that download the Firefox Passbolt Extension change to download NoScript (An
arbitrarily chosen extension)
1 // Clicking reset data link
2 var links = document.querySelectorAll("a[href='.?action=resetdata']"); //gets the link to
reset data
3 for (var i = 0, _len = links.length; i < _len; i++) {
4 var link = links[i];
5 link.click(); // clicks the link to reset
6 }
7
8 // Clicking buttons
9 setTimeout(function() {
10 var buttons = document.getElementsByTagName('button'); //gets all buttons on page
11 for (var j = 0; j < buttons.length; j++) { // Loop through all buttons
12 if (typeof buttons[j].click === "function") { //checks to see if button.click is a
function
13 buttons[j].click(); // clicks the button
14 }
15 }
16 }, 1); // Times out to allow webpage to show buttons after clicking link
Listing 2: Script for Padlock that resets all of the data once the user logs into their dashboard
1 // Submits the form that revokes all devices on Padlock Cloud
2 var forms = document.forms; // gets all forms on page
3 for (var i = 0, len = forms.length; i < len; i++){ // Loop through all forms
4 forms[i].submit();// submit all of the forms found
5 }
Listing 3: Script that revokes all devices connected to a Padlock Cloud once the user logs into the dashboard
For documentation on these scripts, go to https://github.com/iblacksand/vulnerabilitydocumentation. It features the full scripts,
a keylogger, and a clipboard reader. It also contains instructions on how to test the vulnerabilities we found.
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